While we may be dismayed by the outcome of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, we should not be surprised. We saw the same thing happen in Somalia in the 1990s. A handful of local elites funded by international donors gave lip service to the peace- and state-building agendas of their sponsors, while in fact they were simply vying for advantage over their domestic rivals, whom they know will be there as competitors for power long after outside actors depart.
We may not like the Taliban’s ideologies or policies on women’s rights or civil liberties. But we should be realistic about the limits of Western-style “institution building” in societies that have their own long-standing social institutions and practices. While we may criticize U.S. authorities for faulty intelligence or flawed exit strategies, the U.S. did not “lose” Afghanistan. A different faction of Afghans took their country back from their Western-backed local rivals, just as they did from the Soviet-sponsored Afghan regime in the 1980s.
The Philadelphia Inquirer, Letters to the Editor, August 24th, 2021