

University of Pennsylvania
Department of History
History 160

Strategy, Policy, and War

Fall Semester 2014
Professor Arthur Waldron

Summary: History 160 introduces the basic principles of strategic analysis, particularly with respect to armed conflict. This is done primarily by close study of a series of case studies ranging from the Peloponnesian and Punic wars, to the conquests of Napoleon and the unification of Germany, to the Russo-Japanese war and World War I. We also read some of the great analysts of warfare, such as Clausewitz and Sun Zi, as well as such theorists of sea power as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. Requirements include a midterm and standard final examination, as well as two short (3 page) papers and a course paper on a topic of your choice (10-15 pages)

Although this is an introductory course that assumes no previous knowledge, and is thus suitable for freshmen, the material is rarely taught anywhere, certainly not in 99% of colleges and universities, in spite of its absolutely fundamental importance for understanding history and the world. So higher level students will also find it of interest. Graduate students are welcome (see the Instructor about how to get graduate credit)

We meet Tuesday and Thursday 12:00-1:30 in College Hall 200

Lectures, war game (optional), two short (2-3 pages) papers, one longer paper, two standard examinations.

This material is new and some of it is challenging. We do not penalize you for taking it when you could have a certain A if you took an easier course.

Introduction: This course teaches how to think, in a rigorous and informed way, about violence and war. These have always comprised much of human effort and activity. Over history they have cost the deaths of countless millions and they have devastated and destroyed great societies and civilizations. They are perhaps even more dangerous today than ever before. One cannot deny, however, that organized violence in the form of war has nevertheless been one of the most important forces driving history on its crooked course.

Change of every kind—political, intellectual, technological, even artistic--has sprung from war. It is not surprising that one often hears the words of the early Greek philosopher, Heraclitus of Ephesus, (535-475 B.C.E.): “War is the father of all things.”

War and violence can be studied in many ways. The approach adopted in this course is *strategic analysis*. The word “strategy” comes from the ancient Greek *στρατήγος* *strategos*—a *general*. It means: “what generals do.” Generals do not set political goals, nor do they design weapons, nor recruit and supply armies. Rather, they decide how best to achieve desired outcomes, even by the use of deadly force.

This course has three components. First, we study selected conflicts as examples: the Peloponnesian War, Napoleon, World War I, and so forth. We do this so that we can understand not only what strategies were employed, but also what alternative strategies might have changed the outcome, with the loser winning or the winner losing—or even to the avoidance of war altogether. Second, we read some of the great theorists of strategy such as Clausewitz, Sun Zi, Mahan, and others to develop systematic analytical approaches, and since they do not agree about everything, have an opportunity to develop our own ways of thinking. Finally, we examine issues of the theories of victory and methods war termination, which is to say, first, how to begin a war with some hope of actually achieving something, and second, how to end a war in such a way that problems are really solved and the war does not, like the Peloponnesian War or the great European war of the twentieth century, catch fire again after its first phase is ended. Always in our minds too will be the fundamental problem of avoiding war. Much is said about this aspiration, but so far the answer has eluded the searchers. We may shed light on it through our empirical and theoretical studies.

Strategy can be defined as the art of employing whatever means one may have in as efficient a manner possible to attain the objective sought. Making and analyzing it is a demanding intellectual discipline, one that demands both analysis and creativity. Nor, perhaps surprisingly, do basic strategic truths change with technological and economic development, any more than do those of logic or mathematics. *How* we fight has changed almost totally since the days of ancient Greece, with which we begin. But from the point of view of the strategist, the annals of the oar-propelled trireme warships of the Peloponnesian war remain as instructive, to the student of strategic analysis, as the latest achievements of stealthy cruise missiles or other advanced weapons of the present.

Strategic analysis is comparable to economic analysis. They both number among the many often complementary tools we use to consider the world, its history, its current state, and not least what we should or should not do. But unlike economic analysis, on which nearly everyone takes a course or two in college, strategic analysis is scarcely taught—anywhere.

This course has a history. I have been offering it at Penn for almost twenty years. But I started teaching it between 1991 and 1997 when I was Professor of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, R.I. (founded in 1884), where it was invented. Strategic questions have long been studied there. Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) was its first full-time faculty member.

Between World Wars I and II, the college explored possible fleet tactics for a possible war in the Pacific, through seemingly endless war games and simulations. After World

War II Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz (1885-1966) remarked that on the gaming floor in Newport he had seen every operation the Japanese would use against him—save one, the *kamikaze* attack, which even Newport missed.

The teaching of strategic analysis at the Naval War College was transformed between 1972 and 1974, in the days of catastrophic American failure in Vietnam, when Admiral Stansfield Turner (b. 1923) was its president (later he would serve from 1977 to 1981 as Director of Central Intelligence under President Carter). A few distinguished civilian scholars were recruited who, working with experienced military colleagues, developed a curriculum that teaches strategic analysis by the careful study of historical examples.

The college offers a year-long a full master's degree program for students drawn from all branches of the U.S. armed services, as well as from the intelligence agencies, State Department, and so forth. Foreign officer-students represent nearly fifty countries. Many advance to the highest levels of military command, diplomacy, and so forth, in the United States or their home countries.

Our course is a condensed version of that year-long program. Each theorist and each case could occupy us profitably for many weeks. But we *can* learn strategic analysis by the method of case study and survey and distil similar lessons. For any student, not to mention citizen, a familiarity with strategic analysis is important. Many of our gravest and most consequential national decisions involve war and strategy. Not many Americans, however, have much training for how to think about these. Thus, you will notice that when we do take up issues of war and peace, we tend to focus on weapons, tactics, short-term effects, and domestic opinion, without a firm analytical framework. After this course, however, you will have a solid working ability to analyze and make critiques of issues of military policy and strategy, short and long term. You will be equipped to think strategically about your choices as a citizen, and apply strategic analysis wherever your career takes you: to military and government, to business, to the professions—it is applicable and very useful everywhere.

Instructors:

Arthur Waldron
Lauder Professor of International Relations
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University of Pennsylvania
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Biography:

Arthur Waldron has been the Lauder Professor of International Relations in the Department of History at the University of Pennsylvania, since 1997. He works mostly on the history of Asia, China in particular; the problem of nationalism, and the study of war and violence in history. Educated at Harvard (A.B. '71 *summa cum laude* Valedictorian; PhD '81) and in Asia where he lived for four years before returning to Harvard. He previously taught at Princeton University, the U.S. Naval War College (Newport, RI) and Brown University. His publications include *The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth* (1989) also in Italian and Chinese; *The Modernization of Inner Asia* (1991); *How the Peace Was Lost: The 1935 Memorandum "Developments Affecting American Policy in the Far East" Prepared for the State Department by John Van Antwerp MacMurray* (1992) also in Japanese; *From War to Nationalism: China's Turning Point, 1924-1925* (1995) being translated into Chinese at Peking University, and (with Daniel Moran) *The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization since the French Revolution* (2003). His latest book, *The Chinese* should appear in 2015. In addition he has fourteen articles in peer reviewed journals, ten chapters in books, and two edited volumes in Chinese, as well numerous scholarly and popular reviews and journalistic essays. In government, he served as one of twelve members of the highly-classified Tilelli Commission (2000-2001), which evaluated the China operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. He was also an original member of the Congressionally-mandated U.S-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2001-2003). He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and former Director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. A regular traveler, he has visited some fifty countries in Asia and beyond. He has lectured all over the world, including Europe, Russia (in Russian), Australia and Japan. Born in Boston in 1948 Professor Waldron married the former Xiaowei Yü (Born Beijing) in 1988. With their two sons they live in Gladwyne, Pennsylvania.

Office Hours: College Hall 311C T 4:30-6:00 R: 1:30-3:30

Teaching Fellows:***Graders:***

Alex Martin
martale@sas.upenn.edu

***Biography:***

Alex Martin is currently a second year PhD student in the History Department researching military structure and service in early nineteenth-century Korea. His recent research focused on the production of an eighteenth-century military manual, the *Illustrated Compendium of Martial Arts (Muye tobo t'ongji)* and what this document says about late Chosŏn Korea's perception of the role of its military. Prior to starting at Penn, he studied at the University of Washington where he received a Master's degree in International Studies in 2013. His focus there was modern Korea. His research included examining how North and South Korea diverge in their representation of historical figures and the impact such divergence could have on potential unification. He also examined Sino-North Korean relations, particularly China's investments in its northeast along the border with the DPRK. While at the University of Washington he received two FLAS awards for Korean language and a Long Fellowship for Korean studies.

Before returning to academia Alex studied and taught martial arts and yoga for over ten years with the intention of opening a martial arts school. During this time he spent two years living and teaching in Korea. Originally from Chicago, he has lived in Gwangju, South Korea, Los Angeles, London, and Seattle.

Office Hours: Friday 10-11 at Mark's Cafe, Van Pelt Library

William Figueroa



Biography:

William Figueroa is a second year PhD student in the History Department in the transregional history track. His research broadly focuses on connections between China and the Middle East, and especially on the diplomatic, military, and economic relationship between China and Iran. Recently, he completed a study of Cultural Revolution propaganda that dissected Chinese depictions of racial hierarchies embedded in the rhetoric of Third World solidarity. Other projects have included a study on the history of diplomatic relations between China and Israel, a commodity study on the social role of Chinese porcelain in the pre-modern Middle East and Iran, and a comparative study of two historically important Chinese and Iranian modernist novels (Lu Xun's *Diary of Ah Q* and Jamalzadeh's *Persian is Sugar*). His current research involves the movement of Chinese political thought throughout the Middle East, examining the role of Maoism in the formation of Iranian, Palestinian, and Afghan communist parties. His undergraduate studies were completed at Rice University in Texas, where he majored in cultural Anthropology.

William has studied Mandarin Chinese at Peking University in Beijing, and received the Critical Language Scholarship to study Persian Farsi in Tajikistan in 2013. In his personal life he is an avid performance arts enthusiast, and has been involved in four Shakespeare productions with the UPenn Underground Shakespeare Company since arriving at Penn in 2012.

Office Hours: Wednesday 9-10 at Mark's Café, Van Pelt Library

Note:

Please make an effort to come to office hours. These are the times when we get to know the students better. It is also the time during which we can discuss more broadly and in greater depth issues that arise in lectures. As we have no recitations, this is particularly important. Certainly try to come by to discuss papers and projects with any of us—or just to chat about what is on your mind. We very much like to know our students.

Course Requirements and Grading:

*Please note that **we cannot accept** any electronic submissions of papers or the final examination. Please do not email your course submissions to me or my colleagues. We do not have the kind of printing equipment to handle that. So all submissions **must** be typed on paper, with regular fonts, double spacing, and standard margins, and submitted as will be directed.*

We are aware that many courses at Penn are less demanding than this one, yet yield high grades. If you do the work conscientiously, you will do just fine.

Grading:

Here are the approximate weights of the class exercises:

Two short (3-5 page) papers, one in the second week and another in the seventh, to get you thinking about basic issues. 20%

A course paper on a topic of your choice due in the last week of classes (10-15 pages) 30%

Regular mid-term in class, with emphasis on factual knowledge and readings, with very short essay. 20%

Regular final examination, with a greater emphasis on an essay that will test your ability to synthesize and think originally. 30%

The Class Paper:

Think carefully about the examples discussed and issues raised in the course. Then ask yourself, “If I could write a paper about any topic I wanted, what would it be?” Then check with me (best is to send an email outlining your idea and *then* come to office hours)—we will discuss practicalities as well as ideas—and then write it, ten to fifteen typed pages (full credit for that, but write more if you need to)—and submit it at the last meeting of class- 09 December.

*All your written work we will be judged according to quality of argument. That means: your thesis must be clear, you must support it with concrete examples, **you must test it with counter-argument as strong as you can make**, and then explain why your thesis*

prevails. What the content of your argument is, and whether we agree or disagree with it, is not considered in evaluation. So say what you think.

Required Readings:

Books marked with an asterisk [*] at the end of the entry are for sale at the Penn Book Center at the corner of 34th and Chestnut St. Tel: 215 222-7600

Bill Buford, *Among the Thugs* (New York: Vintage Departures, 1993) ISBN 0-679-74535-1 [*]

Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* [1832] (indexed edition) tr. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) ISBN 0-691-01854-5 [*]

Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, tr. Rex Warner, with an Introduction and Notes by M. I. Finley (London: Penguin Books, 1972) ISBN 0-14-044039-9 [*]

Titus Livius Livy *The War with Hannibal: The History of Rome from Its Foundation, Books XXI-XXX* tr. Aubrey de Selincourt (Penguin Classics ed., 1965) ISBN-13: 978-0140441451[*]

John S. Pancake, *1777: The Year of the Hangman* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1977) ISBN 0-8173-0687-0 [*]

Gunther Rothenberg, *The Napoleonic Wars* (2000. Smithsonian History of Warfare. Harper Perennial Reprint Edition, 2006) ISBN-13: 978-0060851217 [*]

A. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783* [1890] (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1943) [*]

Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* [1911] With an Introduction and Notes by Eric J. Grove (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1988) ISBN 0-87021-880-8 [*]

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War: Sun Zi's Military Methods*, tr. Victor H. Mair (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007) ISBN 978-0-231-13383-8 [*]

Dennis Showalter, *The Wars of German Unification* (New York: Bloomsbury USA, 2004) ISBN-13: 978-0340580172

Henry A. Crumpton, *The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA's Clandestine Service* (Penguin Books, 2012) ISBN 978-0-14-312337-8 [*]

Geoffrey Jukes, *The Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905* (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2002) ISBN 1841764469 [*]

Ernst Jünger and Michael Hofmann *Storm of Steel* (1920: Penguin Classics ed., 2004)
ISBN-13: 978-0142437902 [*]

Robert Graves *Goodbye to All That: An Autobiography* (1929. Penguin Modern Classics ed., 2000) ISBN-13: 978-0141184593 [*]

Peter Hart, *Gallipoli* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) ISBN-13: 978-0199361274

War Game:

We have an optional War Game. This is an opportunity to feel firsthand some basic and distinguishing features of wars and the resolution of conflicts. Wars, the military are fond of saying, are “come as you are.” They regularly come by surprise finding parties not necessarily completely or appropriately equipped or mobilized, not to mention intellectually prepared. Decisions are made under extreme pressure of time; they are based on information, much of it inaccurate, that is usually too voluminous to digest, and changes by the minute. But the stakes are often *the very highest*, up to and including the survival of one’s country.

Before the game you will be given some reading about the area where the war will take place. The class will divide into teams representing the relevant countries. Only when you assemble at the venue (to be announced) will you learn what the war actually is. A “control” group consisting of our teaching staff and some visiting experts will explain the situation at the outset. The teams will separate to decide on their “moves” both open and secret. They may communicate with one another, truthfully or not as they choose. They may also consult control, and if they wish to speak, say, to the Saudi defense minister, “control” will provide someone to play that role. After about fifty minutes the groups reassemble and the open moves will be read out. The players then relax while “control” decides what those moves lead to, and how much time elapses. We then reassemble, “control” describes the new situation, and the teams retire again to provide new moves. Usually the game comprises about three moves. It lasts from about 9:00 AM to early afternoon. At the end “control” explains the final situation, which may or may not be the outcome of the war. This is followed by a “hot wash” which is the military term for an all-around evaluation of the game and its lessons, if any, by the full group. Refreshments will be provided.

Lecture Schedule:

We meet Tuesday and Thursday from 12:00 to 1:30 in College Hall 200, Penn’s best classroom.

Week One:

Lecture 1: August 28 Introduction: Violence, War, and Strategy

Week Two:

Lecture 2: September 02

Origins of Violence: Biological or Cultural? *In-class discussion*

Reading: Buford, *Among the Thugs*

Short paper due in class Thursday:

Among the Thugs describes first hand the activities of soccer hooligans in England, which is to say individual and small group violence short of war. In a typed, double spaced paper of 4-5 pages, and drawing your evidence chiefly from the book, consider in particular how violence originates (is it innate, or spontaneous, or hard-wired?), how it is organized, how it develops—and how, sometimes, it ends. To what extent is it inherent in the individual human being? To what extent is it organized and even imposed by society and government?

Lecture 3: September 04

Strategy According to Clausewitz: The Life of Clausewitz

Week Three:

Lecture 4: September 09

Strategy According to Clausewitz, The Essence of War

Lecture 5: September 11

Strategy According to Clausewitz, Operational Implications

Reading: Clausewitz, *On War*, tr. Howard and Paret, Author's Preface and Notes, Books 1, 2, 8.

Week Four:

Lecture 6: September 16

The Peloponnesian War: Prewar Plans

Lecture 7: September 18

The Peloponnesian War: Wartime Realities

Reading: Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* (pp.72-339. Emphasize 72-87; 118-123; 143-173; 265-290; 310-339)

Week Five:

Lecture 8: September 23

The Second Punic War: The Campaigns of Hannibal

Lecture 9: September 25

The Second Punic War: Why Did Rome Win?

Reading: Livy, *The War with Hannibal* (entire)

Week Six:

Lecture 10: September 30
Lecture 11: October 02

War According to Sun Zi: Basic Principles
War According to Sun Zi: Special Points

Reading: Sun Tzu: The Art of War Tr. Victor Mair (entire)

Week Seven:

Lecture 12: October 07

The War of American Independence: Pre-War Assessment

Short paper due in class Tuesday:

In a typed, double spaced paper of 4-5 pages, and drawing your evidence chiefly from the texts of Sun Zi and Clausewitz, compare and contrast the two strategists. Do they represent distinct approaches to war? What do you see as the strengths and weaknesses of each?

October 09

Fall Break

Week Eight:

Lecture 13: October 14

The War of American Independence: Decisive Battle, 1777

Reading: Pancake, Year of the Hangman (emphasize 129-212)

Lecture 14: October 16

Napoleon: Introduction

Week Nine:

Lecture 15: October 21
Lecture 16: October 23

Napoleon: Campaigns
Napoleon: Could Napoleon Have Succeeded?

Reading: Rothenberg, The Wars of Napoleon (entire)

Week Ten:

Lecture 17: October 28

The Wars of German Unification: Denmark and Austria

Lecture 18: October 30

The Wars of German Unification: France and War Termination

Reading: Showalter, The Wars of German Unification

Week Eleven:

Lecture 19: November 04 Intelligence

Reading: Crumpton, *The Art of Intelligence* (entire)

November 06 Midterm examination in class:

This will have three parts: identifications (very specific, choice of five out of six), short responses (choice of two out of three), and a short essay based on the readings (choice of two). You will be responsible for everything up to the examination.

Week Twelve:

Lecture 20: November 11 Sea Power Theory

Reading: Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power and Sir Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*

Lecture 21: November 13 The Russo-Japanese War: The Fighting

Week Thirteen:

Lecture 22: November 18 The Russo Japanese War: Strategic Analysis

Reading: Jukes, *The Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905*

Lecture 23: November 20 The Enigma of World War I: Origins and Strategies

Week Fourteen:

Lecture 24: November 25 The Enigma of World War I: 1914-1916

Reading: Ernst Jünger, *Storm of Steel*
Robert Graves, *Goodbye To All That*

November 27 Thanksgiving Break

Week Fifteen:

Lecture 25: December 02 The Enigma of World War I: 1917-1918

Lecture 26: December 04 The Enigma of World War I: Alternatives?

Reading: Peter Hart, *Gallipoli*

War Game: *Saturday December 6.*

Details to be Announced (Optional)

Read This: It says it all and is some of the finest English prose ever written. F. Scott Fitzgerald (1896-1940) Tender is the Night (1934) beginning of Chapter XIII:

Rosemary waited tensely for Dick to continue.

“See that little stream — we could walk to it in two minutes. It took the British a month to walk to it — a whole empire walking very slowly, dying in front and pushing forward behind. And another empire walked very slowly backward a few inches a day, leaving the dead like a million bloody rugs. No Europeans will ever do that again in this generation.”

“Why, they’ve only just quit over in Turkey,” said Abe. “And in Morocco —”

“That’s different. This western-front business couldn’t be done again, not for a long time. The young men think they could do it but they couldn’t. They could fight the first Marne again but not this. This took religion and years of plenty and tremendous sureties and the exact relation that existed between the classes. The Russians and Italians weren’t any good on this front. You had to have a whole-souled sentimental equipment going back further than you could remember. You had to remember Christmas, and postcards of the Crown Prince and his fiancée, and little cafés in Valence and beer gardens in Unter den Linden and weddings at the mairie, and going to the Derby, and your grandfather’s whiskers.”

“General Grant invented this kind of battle at Petersburg in sixty- five.”

“No, he didn’t — he just invented mass butchery. This kind of battle was invented by Lewis Carroll and Jules Verne and whoever wrote Undine, and country deacons bowling and marraines in Marseilles and girls seduced in the back lanes of Wurtemberg and Westphalia. Why, this was a love battle — there was a century of middle-class love spent here. This was the last love battle.”

“You want to hand over this battle to D. H. Lawrence,” said Abe.

“All my beautiful lovely safe world blew itself up here with a great gust of high explosive love,” Dick mourned persistently. “Isn’t that true, Rosemary?”

“I don’t know,” she answered with a grave face. “You know everything.”

Week Sixteen:

Lecture 27: December 09 The Future: Air Power, Theory and Reality

Papers due in class

Final Examination: *Two hours*; Monday December 15, 12:00-2:00 PM room to be announced. *Identifications and sight passages will be taken from material since the midterm only, but primary emphasis will be placed on an essay (you will have choices of topic) that could well encompass the entire course.*

